potential conflict with the one child policy. Prior to about 1980 China's peasants operated within communes, China's form of collectivized agriculture, and these organizations provided a means to enforce family planning and other policies. But since then the communes have been dismantled, and replaced by the "household responsibility system." Instead of working a s laborers on the commune's fields, peasants now have reverted to working in family production units, with the fields divided up and "contracted out" to the various families. These peasant families generally &ve to deliver contracted quantities of grain or other products to the state, but after fulfilling their contract they can dispose of any surplus themselves. Specialization of peasant families in non-agricultural activities, such as handicrafts, commerce, or the food trade, is now actively encouraged, and a sizeable minority of peasant laborers have now left the land to engage in work in the towns and ~i t i e s .~ This dramatic reform of China's agricultural system has several potential consequences for the one child program, and foreign analysts have seen most of these as harmful. For example, rural leaders (called "cadres" in the political jargon used) should have more difficulty now controlling the activities of a more footloose peasantry, including their reproductive a~t i v i t i e s .~ In addition, nouT that the peasant family is the main unit of production once again, parents should have an added incentive to have more children--in order to increase their family labor force and make possible more ambitious undertakings. (Regulations implemented as part of the rural reforms that limit the number of non-family members who can be hired to work in a family's enterprises--generally to 3 a t most--should also reinforce this e f f e~t . )~ In other words, in the Chinese countryside it would appear that what the government is trying to do with one hand, through the one child campaign, it is undermining with the other, through the household responsibility ~y s t e m .~ So the final major question of interest here is the extent to which this analysis is correct--are the reforms undermining the one child program in the countryside?
We will not be able to satisfactorily resolve all of these questions here. But through data from a number of surveys conducted in recent years in China, many of them by the Chinese coauthors of this article, we hope to be able to gain some insights into the way the one child program is working. What we will attempt to do here is to present as much as possible of the available data from these recent surveys to provide descriptive information on the Chinese family planning program. The first section that follows briefly reviews indicators of actual trends in fertility in China since 1970, but in subsequent sections we will focus primarily upon data that deal with the preferred family size of various segments of the Chinese population. Our assumption is that such data give us a t least rough, and perhaps conservative, indicators of the number of babies people would like to have.g The emphasis here will remain a t the level of description and rather simple analysis because that is all that is possible a t the moment; the original data upon which to carry out more complex kinds of analyses are not available yet outside of China.
China's Fertility Transition
In terms of standard economic indicators, China still remains quite an underdeveloped country. Her estimated GNP per capita in 1984 of US$3 10 placed China in the upper ranges of the low income countries of the world.1° However, in terms of birth and fertility rates, China now looks very different from other low income countries. Birth rates fluctuated erratically during the 1950s and 1960s, but the decade of the 1970s saw a precipitous decline in the childbearing rates of China's population. Table 1 presents figures on the total fertility rate in China for selected 8 . The urban reforms have produced so far only a small number of new household production units, with the vast bulk of urbanites still employed by large-scale organizations. So the potential conflict between the reforms and the one child policy should not be so apparent in China's cities.
9. Given the presence and constant official publicity for the one child campaign, and risks involved in opposing it publicly, one may wonder whether people responded to questions about their preferred number of children honestly. We assume, therefore, that there may be some understating of true preferences, and hence a conservative bias in our figures. However, as will soon become apparent, the studies reported here do not show people simply responding that their preference is to have only one child. It might also be noted that including preferred family size measures in a questionnaire is still somewhat d*cult to do in China One Western researcher who was given permission to conduct a local fertility survey in China in 1981 was told that his preferred family size questions had to be taken out or the study would not proceed. years since 1950. These numbers tell a dramatic story. In 1970 the total fertility rate, an estimate of how many children a woman would have in her lifetime based upon fertility behavior in that year, was no lower than the figure for 1950. Over the next decade there was a drop of more than 60% in the total fertility rate and, in spite of recent fluctuations, low levels of fertility have been 'maintained. In the 1980s China's birth rate figures resemble those from developed countries much more than those from lower income countries." Given China's still low level of development, and sluggsh economic performance in the 1970s, it is clear that this dramatic transformation cannot have been produced by economic modernization. At least a major part of the explanation of this "early demographic transition" must lie in China's family planning campaign. l2 Table 1 about here This dramatic change in fertility behavior has sometimes been interpreted in the West as a result of the "one child campaign." However, it is clear from the figures in Table 1 that this is not the case. The substantial reduction in fertility preceded the introduction of the one child policy in 1979, and that policy, as indicated earlier, was more an effort to keep the birth rate from shooting back upward. Some commentators have also assumed that because of this campaign, now and in the future most Chinese will only be able to have a single child. However, in spite of the vigor with which the campaign has been enforced, about half of all births in recent years have been second or higher parity children, as the figures in Table 2 show. There are no figures available for 1983 which was, as indicated earlier, the "high tide" of enforcement of the one child extraordinary 93% of all babies born in urban China were first births, but in no year (with the possible exception of the missing year, 1983) did China's villagers have more than 51% first births.13 In sum, in spite of the vigor of the Chinese family planning effort in general, and of the "one child campaign" in particular, only about half of the babies born in recent years were, in fact, first children.14 A dramatic fertility transition has occurred in China, and it has occurred prior to substantial economic development, but there is still much less than full compliance with the one child goal the gwernment has stressed in recent years. widely. In the most developed counties included, more than three-quarters of all respondents said that two children were best. But in outlying, less developed, and hilly or minority-group counties, considerable numbers of respondents favored three or more children, and in mountainous
Chongyang County more than 70% of those interviewed wanted a t least three children.
The figures reviewed in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that while there may have been marked success in promoting the idea that small families are good, still there has been less success (at least outside of the army) in gaining acceptance of the idea that having only one child is desirable.ls Still, if people could be induced to want two and only two children this would be a considerable accomplishment. Indeed, some analysts argue that if there were appropriate spacing between children, the same low national population growth rate the government is trying to achieve with its one child policy could be achieved with people having two chi-ldren.'g Does this 17 . Brigades are units within the commune system that generally correspond to large villages. Although formally the communes have now been disbanded, the term brigade is still often used in referring to the village level of rural administration. In selection of brigades, the main concern was to see that the economic and terrain variations within each county were represented. Generally all of the women in the brigade were interviewed.
18. We assume that the figures in these tables represent considerable reductions from the family size preferences that Chinese would have chosen in earlier decades or centuries, although we lack earlier family size preference surveys to prove this point. We do know that in studies of women of child-bearing ages in Taiwan the mean number preferred has dropped from about 4 in the mean, then, that i t should be possible soon to relax the administrative enforcement of the one child policy, since most people in China would be quite willing to stop a t two children?
There are reasons to doubt that the matter is so simple. For one thing, of course, there is the fact that we suspect there may be some systematic understating of family size preferences in these studies, so that "true" answers would reveal a higher percentage of third or higher parity preferences. But an additional problem involves the fact that these data all concern simply
statements about what is the best number of children, with nothing specified about the gender of those children. Clearly in any population feelings about how .many children are best are contingent upon what the sexes of the existing child or children are. There have only been a few studies in China which have asked about family size preferences with the various gender and parity possibilities specified, but those studies that have been conducted tell an interesting story. Table 5 about here
In Table 5 we present results from interviews carried out in 1986 in rural and urban areas of Danjiang County, one of the well developed counties in Hubei Province included in the data described in Table 4 . The respondents were 750 men and women in selected rural areas of that county and 350 men and women in urban areas of that county. The data in the table reveal that in both rural and urban areas less than a quarter of the respondents claimed that they preferred to have two children, no matter what the sexes of those children were. The overwhelming -preference for two children, a s far as most people interviewed in this study went, meant a preference for a boy and a girl. In other words, even if we don't assume understatement of family size preferences in this study and in others, we have to conclude that most of those who had had two boys or two girls (as well a s those with only one child) would be unhappy with their s i t u a t i~n .~~ Biology being what it is, a nicely matched pair with a boy and a girl cannot be g~a r a n t e e d .~~ On the average about half of those who have a second child will not have had one of each sex, and some portion of them are likely to want to go on and have a third child. Indeed, one analysis using the 1982 one-in-one-thousand fertility survey data calculated that, a t the rates of fertility that existed in 1981, about 48% of the women who had had two boys could be expected to go on and have a third child, while about 76% of the women who had had two girls could be expected to go on and have a third So the least acceptable situation is to end up with two daughters, but a considerable share of those who have had two sons are likely to want to try to right the balance by trying again for a daughter. It would be misleading, then, to conclude that the modal family size preference, as revealed in Chinese survey data, is two children. Instead, the most common situation seems to be a desire to have a t least one son and a t least one daughter.
Given this sort of underlying preference, a considerable number of families could be expected to have not only two but even three or four children, if there were not inducements in the family planning program that inhibited them from doing so.
Ideal Family Size and the Chinese Rural Reforms
The data reviewed so far indicate little underlying support for having only one child, and even some difficulties making a two child limit, regardless of the sex of the children, acceptable. 21. Prenatal testing to determine the gender of the child is rarely available in China, but if it becomes available interesting questions and problems will be raised.
22. See Griffith Feeney, Yu Jingyuan, and Chi-hsien Tuan, "Parity Progression Measures of Fertility in China," unpublished paper, 1985, p. 17.
23. This statement assumes that many people would be able to have more children-i.e. that they wouldn't have been sterilized. This seems a safe assumption. To our knowledge, sterilization is not advocated or practiced after one child, but only after a second child, and with increasing vigor after higher parity births. article. However, a number of articles published in China present a contrary view.25 These articles argue that rather than conflicting head-on with official family planning goals, the rural reforms are actually contributing to a lowering of fertility aspirations, thus making it easier in the future to realize the goals of the one child campaign. We wish to summarize this second set of arguments here and see to what extent they are supported by the available local survey data.
As we discussed earlier, the advocates of the "pronatal impact of the rural reforms" argument contend that the restoration of the peasant family as a production unit fosters higher fertility, both by giving families stronger reasons for wanting to build up a large and differentiated family labor force and by making the supervision of peasant lives and activities (including childbearing) more indirect and difficult., The contrary set of arguments about the "anti-natal impact of the rural reforms" is quite different. These arguments focus not on the operation of family farms, but on the general economic and opinion trends that the rural reforms have unleashed.
Essentially these arguments pin their hopes on a modernization of fertility aspirations--on trying to get peasants to think about the number of children to have in a manner that has long been associated with urbanites, but not with peasants.
Under the reform policies, becoming wealthy is officially encouraged, and conspicuous consumption is no longer frowned upon, as it was when Mao Zedong was alive. The mass media are full of articles about peasants buying televisions, sewing machines, and trucks and building fancy new houses. Press accounts of the "specialized households" and "10,000 yuan households" who are prospering in the reform era do not, for obvious reasons, stress their successful mobilization of a large family labor force. Instead, in addition to hard work, emphasis is placed upon education and technical skills as the primary ways to rise above the lot of an ordinary peasant. More and more village dwellers are leaving the land and taking jobs in town factories and shops, but again education and specialized skills are seen as primary requirements for this upward mobility. Peasants (or former peasants) who succeed in this competition are portrayed as having both the time and resources to engage in a variety of cultural and leisure time pursuits and hobbies, and these activities again set them apart from their neighbors.
The message being conveyed to China's rural dwellers is fairly simple. Under the reform program, individuals and families can now become rich ahead of others and even leave the peasantry entirely, rather than being stuck within the egalitarian confines of the commune system. The way to succeed in this competition is not, in fact, to have a large number of children, a s this would only depress family income (in the short run, a t least) and make it difficult to invest sufficiently in any family member to produce the hoped for prosperity and mobility. Instead, it makes most sense in the reform era to have very few children, and to invest in the development of the human capital of members of a small family. Such investment is likely to lead to prosperity and success, and success will, in turn, bring the ability to expend family funds on consumer goods and leisure activities, rather than simply on feeding the family. And if the parents are willing to go as far as to pledge to have only one child, that child is supposed to receive preferential treatment in developing his or her human capital in both schooling and jobs, making upward mobility even more likely.
It is often argued that as the economy was transformed in the West, changes took place in the organization of work, family structure, and income levels, and that these produced heightened aspirations for mobility, consumption, and leisure. These heightened aspirations, in turn, led to a decline in desired family size, and these led finally to reduced fertility. What the publicity C surrounding the rural reforms in China seems to be trying to do is to alter this causal chain. By directly altering mobility, consumption and leisure aspirations it is hoped that desired family sizes will be reduced, even among villagers whose social envirozments have not yet been substantially transformed or modernized. 26 Tables 6 and 7 about here To what extent has this effort to change peasant aspirations, and thereby change preferred family size, been successful? We will review some data from Chinese surveys that touch upon this question. In Table 6 we present preferred family size data from a 1983 survey of 525 married women of child-bearing age in Hongan County, Hubei Province. These data show that there is a clear relationship between the educational level of the women interviewed and the responses they gave to the question about how many children would be best. Women who had had a t least a senior high school education were more likely to consider one child, and much less likely to prefer three children or more, than were other women. In Table 7 we examine the preferred family sizes of these women, classified by the occupations of their husbands. Among the non-peasant occupations there is little differentiation, but women with peasant husbands were much more likely to prefer three or more children, and much less likely to consider having only one child, than were women whose husbands had non-agricultural occupations. These tables give a t least some support to the idea that individuals with more "modern" personal characteristics will have lower preferred family sizes. 27 Tables 8 and 9 about here Data from the same study dealing with family economic conditions, on the other hand, tell a somewhat different story. In Table 8 we examine responses of these same women, classified now in terms of the level of per capita family income of their families. This table reveals a curvilinear pattern. Women from families with moderately high income, in the range 151-250 yuan per capita, were likely to prefer smaller families than were very poor women, but the highest average family size preference was expressed by women from the richest families surveyed. A more unambiguous pattern is shown in Table 9 . There we can see that there is a positive correlation between preferred family size and the amount of housing space the family has. People with the most spacious housing, who may be assumed to be relatively well off, want to have larger families than anyone else. There is some ambiguity about these patterns, since age may be a confounding factor, with both prosperity and larger preferred family sizes more often found a t later stages of the life cycle.28 In any case, it is clear that being better off than your neighbors, per se, is not something that leads automatically to lower fertility desires. The opposite may more nearly be the case.29 But the critical factor, according to the "anti-natal impact of the reforms" argument, is
. not income, but rather consumption and other aspirations. Tables 10 and 11 about here Data from the same study can be used to examine the relationship between occupational and educational aspirations and preferred family size. In Table 10 we see the association between 27 . The Hubei data also show that younger women, unmarried women, and women living in two generation rather than three generation families, express desires for smaller numbers of children than do other women (tables not shown here).
28. A separate table, not shown here, showed a positive relationship between age and preferred family sue. However, since the data for this study are not available outside of China, we were not able to perform multivariate analysis to untangle these relationships.
29. Some Chinese demographers argue that in wealthy suburban villaps the relationship between family income and preferred family size is being "reversed," so that better off families want fewer children than their neighbors. However, data are not yet available outside of China to substantiate this claim.
the hoped for occupation of one's child or children and preferred family size. In general there is a moderate association between hoping that a child will rise above the peasantry and preferring a smaller number of children. The association between educational aspirations for one's children and preferred family size, as shown in Table 11 , is even more striking. In that table we can see not only a strong relationship between high educational aspirations and low preferred family size, but also that among those who hope that their child will attend college, a sizeable minority say that one child is best. So high aspirations for one's children do seem associated with acceptance of small family sizes, although it takes quite a high level of aspirations to win many converts for the one child ideal. Tables 12 and 13 about here We can gain further information about how rural people look upon having children by reviewing data from the 1986 survey in Danjiang County, Hubei Province, discussed earlier. In that study both rural and urban respondents were asked about the specific advantages and disadvantages of having more children. In Table 12 we present the responses dealing with the advantages. (Multiple responses were allowed.) For the most part these figures testify to rural
residents not yet having developed very "modern" attitudes in regard to children. We see that significantly more rural respondents than urban ones mentioned old age support, continuity of the family line, family labor power, and the strength of the lineage as advantages of having more children, while significantly fewer rural respondents mentioned the children a s helping to improve relations between the spouses or as being enjoyable to interact with per se. This pattern of responses must be profoundly troubling to advocates of the view that the reforms are generating modernized orientations in regard to children in rural areas.
The figures in Table 13 present a little more encouragement to such advocates, however.
When asked what the disadvantages of having more children were, rural respondents again had somewhat different views than urban respondents. There are a number of interesting patterns visible in the table, including the fact that rural respondents were more concerned about the cost of raising children. (Objectively it costs more to raise a child in the city, and it is usually argued that rural children can become net contributors to family income a t a relatively early age.) But the figure that leaps out of the table a t you is the fact that 70% of the rural respondents, but only 9% of the urban ones, mention concern over the future success of children as a major disadvantage of having more children. Taken together these tables suggest that, while peasants may continue to hold a number of traditional orientations in regard to childbearing, these may be a t least demonstrate that high aspirations for one's children are not confined to a small number of peasant families, but are extraordinarily widespread, a t least in Hongan County.
We don't have comparable figures from many other areas, but the limited data available seem to present a similar picture. For example, in four other Hubei counties surveyed in 1981 61% of the rural respondents hoped their children could attend college, 38% hoped they could finish secondary school, and only 1% said they would be satisfied with primary s~h o o l i n g .~~ The other data we have on aspirations for children all come from urban areas, but they suggest if anything even higher levels of aspirations in the cities.32
We do not have detailed data on other forms of aspirations, such as for consumption and leisure activities. But the limited data available on aspirations for children suggest an interesting interpretation. First, the figures reviewed here do lend some credibility to the "anti-natal impact of the reforms" argument. For example, the figures in Tables 14 and 15 do suggest that having lofty aspirations for one's children is very common among peasants in China in the reform era.
And we have already seen that having high aspirations for children, particularly high educational aspirations, is associated with stating a preference for a small family, and even for the approved single child family. So there seem to be elements in rural opinion trends that are conducive toward reduced family size preference^.^^
On the other hand, what these surveys also suggest is that the peasants interviewed were being wildly unrealistic, even if one makes the most optimistic assessments of the prospects for 31. Gu Shengzu, "An Exploration into Rural Fertility Desires," op. cit 32. For example, a Shanghai study of 158 parents of only children found that 18 hoped their child would graduate from secondary school, 83% hoped for college degrees, and 168 aspired to advanced degrees. See Xue Suzhen, e t al., "The Family Education of Only Children," in Chen Kewen and Qu Qingyun, eds., Collected Essays on the One Child Question, (in Chinese), Beijing: Chinese Population Problems Research Group, 1985, pp. 197-8. A survey of 401 parents of only children in Qizhou, a county town in Hubei, found an astounding 48% who wanted their children to go on to graduate school. In the Shanghai and Qizhou studies only 1-11% of the parents of only children chose "worker" as the desired occupation for their child, and even for parents with more than one child over 7 0 5 were hoping for prestigious white collar occupations. (Qizhou data from Gu Shengzu's survey file.)
33. To be sure, we don't have comparable survey data for earlier points in time, and we can't be certain of how the levels of aspirations reported here would compare with what would have been found, say, in the 1960s or 1970s. And there are lots of traditional Chinese sayings that encourage lofty aspirations-for example, "Hope a son can become a dragon, and hope a daughter can become a phoenix" (wang zi cheng long, wang nu cheng feng). But we doubt that the average peasant ever had the sort of high hopes testified to in these tables, and there is some evidence that expectations in the immediately preceding period were much lower. For example, one ethnographic study of a Guangdong village at the end of the 1970s argued that the policies pursued during the Cultural Revolution had largely eliminated the thirst for education in rural areas. See Steven Mosher, Broken Earth. New York: The Free Press, 1983, Chap. 5.
China's reform program. This is, after all, a society in which about 80% of the population are peasants, and that figure is not very likely to be reduced to 25% within a generation. It is also a society in which less than 4% of young people of college age are admitted to a university, with most of these being graduates of urban schools, and it is highly improbable that a generation from now 65% of rural youths will be admitted to college.
The unrealistic nature of these aspirations suggests that the Chinese government is taking what may be a risky gamble. The authorities are encouraging rural people to develop high aspirations for themselves and their children. Such aspirations do have a number of positive consequences. They are seen as motivating peasants to work hard and be innovative economically and encouraging their children to study hard in school and strive to get ahead. And they also are expected to promote a desire for fewer children. High aspirations may make small family size preferences possible, but in order to try to make having only one or two children acceptable, no matter what the sex of those children, a level of aspirations is being fostered that cannot realistically be satisfied. In the short run these heightened aspirations may help to counteract the pronatal impact of the revival of family farming and make small family sizes more acceptable.
But in the long run there is considerable danger that when aspirations are not satisfied problems will arise. For example, given aspirations of this sort, where will the diligent peasants and highlymotivated factory workers of the next generation come from? So the enforcement of the one child policy may be made somewhat easier by these opinion trends, but the cost, in terms of mass dissatisfaction in later years, may be considerable.
Conclusions
The data reviewed in this paper are from scattered locales, and many of the studies did not use the best research methodology. Still, the studies reviewed here are suggestive of several conclusions. We noted clear evidence that in only a decade China had made the transition from levels of fertility typical of the third world td levels much closer to those of advanced industrial societies, and we commented that this shift offered proof, if evidence is still needed, of the possibility of bringing about a "demographic transition" long before high levels of "modernization" have been reached. We also noted that in the 1980s there has been much less than full compliance with the official one child policy, although the percentage of single parity births is quite high in comparative terms. In part this lack of full compliance reflects the fact that although family size preferences have no doubt decreased, still very few people, even in urban areas, would prefer to have only a single child. Two children would be acceptable to most people in both rural and urban areas, but only if those two were a boy and a girl. Thus if underlying family size preferences were the only influence on fertility behavior, we can assume that considerably more women than are currently doing so would be having not only second children, but also third and higher parity births.
The effort to promote the one child goal consists not only of applying administrative measures to keep underlying family size preferences from being expressed. In addition, there are strenuous efforts to change these underlying preferences. These involve primarily convincing families that their interests can be best advanced by having small, rather than large, numbers of children, and particularly by having only one. And the central element of this strategy is the effort to raise popular aspirations for social mobility, education, consumption, and leisure.
.. From the data reviewed here it appears that some success has been achieved in this effort.
The level of aspirations visible, a t least in regard to the future lives of one's children, seems extraordinarily high, and those people who do have high aspirations are more likely to feel that one child or two is best. In a sense, the challenge these developments present to the standard sort I of modernization-induced demographic transition argument is even greater than previously implied. I t is not simply the case that fertility has dropped sharply in advance of substantial economic development. It also appears that some success has been achieved in changing the attitudes and aspirations of even Chinese peasants so that these have been a t least partially change and the attitudinal transformation provide testimony to the sort of social engineering that is possible in an extraordinarily tightly organized society such a s China.
Still, there are troubling issues raised by these unprecedented changes. On the one hand, even with the major efforts that have been made, it has not been possible yet to reduce the underlying preferences of the great majority of Chinese below two, and so the one child campaign remains difficult to enforce. And this strategy has run into a dead end, since it is hard to imagine aspirations being raised even further in order to induce lower fertility. In addition, it is unclear whzt consequences will flow from the high levels of aspirations that the reform policies have engendered. If people perceive that they are having to make sacrifices by bearing fewer children than they would prefer, and if they later discover that the rewards that were supposed to come to those who made such sacrifices don't materialize, then the grounds will have been prepared for widespread disenchantment and anger. So in addition to having to worry about how to manage the negative feelings generated by the one child program itself in the short run, the authorities will have to worry about how in the long run to manage the expectation levels that have been built up as part of the effort to make the one child policy more acceptable. 
SOURCE:
The interviews included in Table 4 from Hongan County, which were conducted with 525 randomly selected married women of childbearing age in 18 villages and 7 urban enterprises in that county in 1983. From the survey file of Gu Shengzu. SOURCE: Same as Table 6 , 400 rural women only
